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LAW NOTE
HOW BIG A HOUSE OF CARDS? Private
Actions and Insiders Under Rule 10b-5.
INTRODUCTION
What has happened to Rule lOb-5 . . .always reminds
me of a cartoon of. . . Mussolini dictating to his secretary,
and the caption was, "'Miss Baccigalupi, take a law."
Whenever I try to explain to a foreign lawyer . . . how
we have developed in this country a scheme jbr grappling with
the problems of insider preferences and so on, more and more
I become increasingly ashamed, and that is the only word I
can use at this sort of jurisprudence. It is awfilly hard...
to explain with a straight fice how it is that this came about
in this great country of ours. It is a development that,
needless to say, I applaud. It was long overdue. But do we
have to go on indefinitely basing this whole revolutionary
change on a section of the Exchange Act that says it shall be
unlawfil Jbr any person in the purchase or sale of any
security to engage in any act or practice that the S.E.C.
prescribes as manipulative or deceptive? How big a house of
cards can we continue to build on that? This is backdoor
jurisprudence with a vengeance.*
Today, the federal court interpretations of Rule lOb-5,'
promulgated by the SEC (under the authority of a federal
statute, section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act)2 have
become the cornerstone of a federal common law of
corporations.' Recently there has been expansive use of the rule
to afford a private civil remedy for a "defrauded" 4 buyer or
* Loss, HistorY of S.E.C. Legislation Programs and Suggestions for a Code, 22
Bus. LAWYER 795, 796 (1967).
I. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964).
3. See Ruder, PitJalls in the Development oJ a Federal Law of Corporations by
Implication Through Rule lOb-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 185-91 (1964); see Fleischer,
.'Federal Corporations Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1147, 1153
(1965); cJ. A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW. FRAUD S.E.C. RULE 10B-5 §§ 1.1, 2.7(4)
(1967).
4. A securities "fraud" is quite different from common law fraud. Broadly, any
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seller of securities. The right to sue for either damages or
rescission was not explicitly given by the statute or the rule,
rather it has been implied by the courts. The dimensions of this
new judicially created right of action are still developing on a
case by case basis. Each court which has a securities fraud
question before it, reads into the right of action under Rule lOb-
5 the elements of proof, restrictions, allowable plaintiffs and
defendants which it deems appropriate. Precedent from common
law actions of fraud are largely disregarded, for the right to sue
emanates from a federal statute. Hence the courts are free to
mold, at their pleasure, the right of action and remedy. The
result has been that each circuit court of appeals has interpreted
the rule differently, creating a lack of uniformity and a confused
area of law.
In the Securities Act of 1933, 5 Congress declared a
standard of full disclosure in the distribution of securities to the
public. Congress armed itself with weapons to insure compliance
with its command "Thou shalt disclose the whole truth" when
preparing a registration statement-the corporate picture which
is presented to the public in a public offering of securities. In
addition to the criminal penalties provided by the Act,' the SEC
could impose certain administrative sanctions, investigate,' and
sue for injunctions in a federal court.8 Moreover, three carefully
drawn statutory civil remedies were created to deter practices of
nondisclosure or misrepresentation in connection with the sales
of securities. The first part of this note will discusss how the
"implied" remedy under Rule lOb-5 often allows a plaintiff to
completely disregard the restrictions placed upon the express civil
remedies made available to him by Congress in favor of a loosely
defined, judicially created right of action. It will reexamine the
basis of the Rule and observe the inconsistencies between the
implied right of action and the express statutory remedies.
The surge of actions brought under Rule lOb-5 has
conduct which a court determines is "unfair" in a security transaction, and violates the
broad language of the rule, is fraud. Cy SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180 (1963) (discussing the term "securities fraud," regarding the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940); cf A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, at § 2.16.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bb (1964).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1964).
8. See generally on S.E.C. organization 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1877-
1983 (2d ed. 1961).
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presented a dilemma which the courts have recognized in dictum
if not in decision. Never before have there been so many
potential plaintiffs for actions under Rule l0b-5. As the scope of
what constitutes a violation of the rule broadens, accordingly,
the group in which a plaintiff may be found grows. The courts
have yet to place any express limits on this group. Never before
have there been so many potential defendants for a Rule lOb-5
action. As the variety of ways in which a violation may occur
increases, accordingly, the group of potential defendants expands.
The failure of the courts to place express limitations on the
rights of plaintiffs presents the possibility of the imposition of
excessive, and sometimes even double liability on violators of
Rule lOb-5, and may foster unnecessary litigation. The second
part of this note will demonstrate this unlimited growth of
potential plaintiffs and defendants by examining recent cases in
the area of insider conduct. These cases, primarily involving
brokers who are representative of defendants, fully illustrate the
dilemmas created by the courts' decisions.
I. BUYER'S PRIVATE ACTIONS
At the outset it must be observed that securities are a unique
commodity requiring unique regulation. Corporate securities
increasingly represent a substantial part of the life savings of the
average man; it is becoming quite common for an American to
own a proprietary interest in one or more corporations. The
restoration of public confidence in the securities market after the
stock market crash of 1929 was an underlying policy of the
federal securities actY Common law actions, such as deceit 0 and
rescission" were generally not adequate to handle the
9. See Fleischer, supra note 3, at 1174-75.
10. The classical common law tort action for deceit was an intentional
misrepresentation of material Jact which caused damage to the plaintiff who justifiably
relied on it. In many jurisdictions the action has been modified in various ways. For
example, some jurisdictions allow an action for negligent misrepresentation, although the
persons to whom the defendant is liable is more strictly limited. See Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (accounting firm not liable for negligent
misrepresentation to unspecified third parties whom they did not authorize the receipt of
information contained in accounting statement). See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§§ 100-02 (3rd ed. 1964).
II. Simply stated, the elements for rescission are a misrepresentation of a material
Jact upon which the plaintiff relied. The underlying principle of the action is that a seller
should not be permitted to unjustly enrich himself in the sale of an item which he
misrepresents, whether innocently, negligently, or intentionally. The misrepresentation
1969]
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peculiarities of securities "swindles 12 on a national scale. 3 In
order to fill this void Congress created civil remedies in the
Securities Act which were more appropriate to securities fraud."
A. The Express Statutory Remedies
The overall purpose of the Securities Act was to protect the
investing public, without unduely hampering honest business
transactions. 5 Three express civil remedies were afforded the
buyer of securities.
Section 116 provides liability for a false registration
statement that has become effective. 17 It is based upon the
common law action of deceit, 8 with some significant changes.
Generally, a section 11 suit requires an allegation that a
registration statement contains a misrepresentation of a material
fact, 9 and that the plaintiff bought securities which were the
subject of the registration statement. Further, the plaintiff must
prove that the action was brought within the short statute of
limitations. 0 Specifically, the limitation is one year from the
gives a court grounds to make the contract void. If the misrepresentation was
intentional, the fact need not be material. Causation, damage, and scienter (knowledge on
the part of the seller) need not be shown. The buyer must also allege privity of contract
between the plaintiff and defendant, for he must tender the item sold, restoring the seller
to the status quo ante. 3 L. Loss. supra note 8, at 1626.
12. See generally White, Front the Frying Pan into the Fire: Swindlers and the
Securities Acts, 45 A.B.A.J. 129 (1959).
13. See H. BLOOMENTHAL. CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURITIES LAW 402 (1966).
The jurisdictional problems of state law in obtaining service of process upon a defendant
who resides beyond its boarders has been solved by a provision in both the Security and
Exchange Acts of interstate service or process. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v. 78aa (1964).
14. Id.
15. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 6, 7 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
Ist Sess. I, 2 (1933).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
17. There is no liability under this section for misstatements in a preliminary
prospectus, "tombstone ad" used prior to the effective date, or for post-effective
developments which make the registration statement inaccurate. H. SOWARDS, II
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS. SECURITIES REGULATION. THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT.
§ 9.02 [I] (1967).
18. 44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 122, 125 (1968).
19. A misrepresentation includes both "an untrue statement of a material fact or...
[an omission of] a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make tile
statements therein not misleading .... . 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964).
A material fact is "a fact which if it had been correctly stated or disclosed would
have deterred or tended to deter the average prudent investor from purchasing the
securities in question." In re Charles A. Howard, I S.E.C. 6, 8 (1934).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964). See L. Loss, supra note 8, at 1744.
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discovery of the misstatement or when such discovery should
have been made in the exercise of reasonable diligence, with a
maximum of three years after the security has been offered to the
public.2' The investor need not prove reliance upon the false
statement unless he acquired the security after one year from the
date of the registration statement and the issuer had made
available an earnings statement for the previous 12 months. 2
Section II holds those persons who were responsible for,
participated in the preparation of, or signed the registration
statement liable for, negligent misrepresentations? It also shifts
the burden of proof of due care to the defendants. 2' In effect, the
statute creates a duty in the defendants to make a reasonable
investigation of the facts represented in the registration statement
so as to not mislead the investing public. However, there are
specific defenses available to these defendants,' 5 and the allowable
damages are limited and intricately defined.!6
Section 12(2),27 the general civil liability section, is
essentially a modified version of the common law remedy of
rescission.2 8 It allows the investor to recover the purchase price
from his immediate seller 9 for a misrepresentation of a material
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964).
23. The class of prospective defendants includes: the issuing corporation, officers
who sign the registration statement, all directors, experts (e. g. accountants, engineers,
appraisers), and underwriters, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964).
24. All defendants have this affirmative defense except for the issuer. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b)(3) (1964).
25. E.g.. a defendant is immune from liability if he had properly resigned from his
office prior to the effective date of the registration statement and advised the Commission
of such action; another defense is that the plaintiff knew of the misleading statement. 15
U.S.C. § 77k(a), 77k(b)(l) (1964).
26. Damages may be briefly summarized as follows:
Section I I(e) provides that the maximum recovery of such damages shall be
the difference between the amount paid for the security (not in excess of the
public offering price) and (1) the value of the security as of the time the
action is brought, or (2) the price at which the security was sold in the
market beJore suit, or (3) the price at which the security was sold in the
market alter suit but before judgment "if such damages shall be less than the
damages representing the difference between the amount paid for the security
(not exceeding the price at which the security was offered to the public) and
the value thereof as of the time suit was brought." (citations omitted).
H. Sowards, supra note 17, at § 9.02 [5].
27. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
28. 3 L. Loss, supra note 8, at 1700.
29. Liability is also imposed upon those in a "control relationship" to the seller. 15
U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
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fact in a sale or offer where the mails or other interstate means
of communication are used. It includes, but is not limited to,
securities sold pursuant to a public offering that were required to
be registered. Hence a security sold from an offering circular
under a Regulation A30 exemption could be the subject of a
rescission-type section 12(2) action. While privity of contract is
required,3 1 neither reliance nor scienter are part of the plaintiff's
burden of proof.32 Upon tender of the security, a buyer may
recover his consideration plus interest, less any income he
received therefrom.:3 3 If the buyer no longer holds the security, he
may recover damages equivalent to the purchase price less the
price at which he sold it.: Hence, the buyer is better off using
section 12(2) than the common law action of rescission.
Section 12(1), 31 the third civil liability section, imposes
almost absolute liability for improper registration'37 and is
similar to section 12(2) in the relief granted.
Although Congress enacted new civil remedies which were
more liberal than the common law forms of recovery, they
counterbalanced these remedies with procedural impediments.
The intricate features of section I 1 make this observation all the
more evident. While sections I1 and 12(2) place the burden of
due care on the defendants and delete some of the common law
elements of proof required for rescission or deceit, certain
restrictions upon recovery are imposed which amount to a
30. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263 (1968).
31. There are two exceptions to the privity requirement-controlling persons. and
possibly aiders and abettors. 3 L. Loss. supra note 8, at 1704, 1712-20.
32. Id. at 1702, 1704.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964).
34. Id.
35. For example, buYer need not prove that he relied on the misstatement, if he no
longer owned the security, he could still recover damages, and the privity requirement was
relaxed. 3 L. Loss. supra note 8, at 1702-04.
But, there were several disadvantages to the use of section 12(2). The defendant-seller
had an affirmative defense which was not available at common law rescission-that he
did not know or in the exercise or reasonable care could not have known of the untruth
or omission; the buyer must prove "materiality," even for intentional misstatements or
omissions of the defendant, also not required at common law rescission: use of interstate
facilities or mail used in connection with the fraud must be proved by the buyer. This last
requirement would often be the buyer's nemesis, relegating him to his state remedies. Id.
at 1704, 1705.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 771(l) (1964).
37. 3 L. Loss. supra note 8, at 1693.
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separate code of procedure.*- In section I I several defenses are
specified. Damages are limited and specific in both sections II
and 12. The plaintiff must allege that he brought his section 11
or section 12 suit within the short period allowed by statute "'
The trial judge now is given the discretionary power to require a
bond from either the plaintiff or defendant" If the litigant's suit
is without merit, the security can be used as liability against him
to pay for his adversary's costs of the suit, including reasonable
attorney's fees.' Generally, these statutes provide the investor
with a less difficult cause of action and a federal forum. Prospec-
tive defendants (the issuers, underwriters, brokers, directors, etc.)
on the other hand are accommodated with not only the procedural
safeguards mentioned above, but also a fair warning as to what
conduct is forbidden.
The civil liability sections seem to afford a certain degree of
predictability- a jurisprudentiai virtue 2 Prior to 1949,1: there was
general agreement that the express civil liability sections provided
exclusive relief for the defrauded buyer.44 However, the courts
have permitted recovery for the buyer by implying liability for
violation of the substantially similar section 17(a) 5 of the
Securities Act and Rule l0b-5.
38. Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
39. The statute of limitations, paraphrased in the text at note 24, applies to both
§ II and § 12(2). The limitation for § 12(1) is somewhat different. 15 U.S.C. § 77m
(1964). See H. SOWARD. supra note 17, at § 9.05.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964). This provision is made applicable also to actions
under section 12. 3 L. Loss. supra note 8, at 1727, 1836-42.
41. Id.
42. However, quaere how predictable will the courts be in view of the interpretation
given to the section I I defense of a reasonable investigation in Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (all defendants were held liable for a
misleading registration statement, including one "outside' director who had been with
the corporation for less than a month). See Heller, Comment BarChris: A Dialogue on a
Bad Case Making Hard Law, 57 GEO. L.J. 221 (1968); Note, BarChris. Due Diligence
Refined, 68 COLUI. L.J. 1411 (1968); 45 NOTRE DA.MtE LAWYER 122 (1968); Note, 47
TEXAS L. REv. 162 (1968).
43. In 1949 for the first time an implied right of action for a buyer was permitted in
Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
44. See 3 L. Loss. supra note 8, at 1785; H. SOWARDS, supra note 17, at § 10.01
[I]; Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities Act o1 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 181-82
(1933); Landis, Liability Sections oJ Security Act, 18 AMIERICAN ACCOUNTANT 330
(1933); Sommer, Rule lOb-5: Notes For Legislation, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 1029, 1034
(1966).
45. Prior to 1949 section 17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964)]
"had unvaryingly been regarded only as the basis for criminal and injunctive proceedings
under section 20 [15 U.S.C. § 77t (1964)] of the 1933 Act and administrative
1969]
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B. The Kardon Doctrine-Implied Liability Jbr the Defrauded
Seller
While the disclosure procedures in the Securities Act appear
to provide adequate relief to a buyer, no corresponding
protection is afforded to defrauded sellers. The primary purpose
of the SEC in promulgating Rule lOb-5, which outlawed a broad
range of deceptive conduct, was to close this gap.46 Although the
proceedings against broker-dealers under section 15 [15 U.S.C. § 78o (1964)] of the 1934
Act." Sommer, supra note 44, at 1034 (footnotes omitted).
Buyers tend to use Rule lOb-5 more than section 17 because of the wealth of case law
on the former. But, after Globus r. Law Research Service Inc.. 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) this may no longer be true, as punitive damages are available under section 17(a) but
not Rule lOb-5. Regardless, anything said of Rule lOb-5 would generally be applicable to a
section 17(a) suit.
46. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act makes it unlawful in the offer of securities by
mail or interstate means:
(I) to employ any devise, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
In 1942 the SEC adopted Rule l0b-5 under the authority of § l0b ol te
Exchange Act which said:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange .. . [t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Cnomnission ma " prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors (emphasis addedy.
15 U.S.C. § 77j (1964).
As one writer observed:
Rule lob-5, with minor changes and one major change, simply repeated
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. The major change, and the one which
motivated the adoption of the rule, was the application of those protections
to the sellers of securities as well as the buyers.
Sommer, supra note 44, at 1033-34 (footnotes omitted).
Rule lob-5 reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading or
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Exchange Act contains express provisions for civil liability, 7
Rule lOb-5 does not expressly authorize private actions by
sellers. It was not difficult, however, for the court in Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co.4" to deduce from the rule a right for a
defrauded seller of stock to sue the buyer. The action was
brought by two former directors (father and son) of a closed
corporation against two other directors (brothers). The brothers
allegedly conspired to induce the father and son to sell their
shares to the brothers by fraudulently representing that no
negotiations were pending for the sale of the assets of the
corporation when in fact there had been. The securities were not
the subject of a public offering, nor was a stock broker used.
Judge Kirpatrick justified the implied action from Rule lOb-
5, upon two theories. The first ground was a statutory tort
theory, contained in the Restatement of Torts § 286 (1934). The
court announced that a violation of a legislative enactment by
doing a prohibited act or by failing to do a required act
rendered the actor liable for invading the interests of
another4'-provided that:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to
protect an interest of the other as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is
intended to protect . . ..
The alternative rationale was a void contract theory. Section
29(b) of the Exchange Act-5 provided that contracts in violation
of any provision of the act shall be void. The court observed that
this provision would be of little value unless an action for
damages, as well as rescission, was allowed.52 The remedy
awarded in Kardon was "an accounting to ascertain and restore
to the plaintiffs their proportionate share of profits, if any. '1'53
Finding a right to sue the defendants in Kardon appears
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale oi an " security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968) (emphasis added).
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b), 78r(a) (1964).
48. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
49. 69 F. Supp. at 513.
50. RESTATEMENTS OF TORTS § 286 (1934).
51. 15 U.S.C.§ 78cc(b) (1964).
52. 69 F. Supp. at 514.
53. Kardon v. National Gypsum, 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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equitable when limited to the facts of the case. The complaint
alleged a conspiracy to purchase fraudulently the shareholder's
stock for less than its true value. The Rule lOb-5 action allowed
the sellers, who were not otherwise covered by an express civil
liability provision, a forum in a federal court with interstate
service of process and an advantageous venue requirement.
Further, the difficult elements of proof for rescission or deceit at
common law were parried by using Rule lOb-5 as a basis for a
judge-made version of the common law actions.
The underlying basis for a right of action implied from Rule
lOb-5 has not been elucidated by the courts since Kardon. If any
rationale is offered, most courts adopt the statutory tort theory."
It appears that the courts need the tort theory to justify the
inclusion of defendants who are not in privity of contract with
the plaintiff.5 5 Hence, the void contract theory would not provide
the justification for an action where something more than
rescission is sought."
C. Ellis v. Carter-Implied Liability Jor the Defrauded Buyer
Once the door was opened to the defrauded seller for a
judicially created private right of action in Kardon, the buyer
was quick to seize upon it and ask for parity. Indeed, it would be
difficult for a court to deny the plaintiff-buyer such a right in
54. A. BROMBERG. supra note 3, at § 2.4(l)(a).
55. E. GADSBY, I IA BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS, SECURITIES REGULATION. TIlt
FEiERAL S:CURITIES IXCHANGI; ACT Of, 1934, at § 5.03(](a).
56. The Supreme Court in J.1. Case Co. v. Borak. 377 U.S. 426 (1964), did not
clarify what the basis was for implied liability when it determined there was such a right
of action for a violation of the proxy rules of the Exchange Act. The Supreme Court's
explanation for implied liability was that it was "the duty of the courts to be alert to
provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the Congressional purposes."
d. at 433. There is some speculation that the Supreme Court would probably uphold
implied liability under Rule lOb-5 if it were presented with the issue, based on the result
of the Borak case. A.B.A. National Institute, "The BarChris Case: Prospeetu,
Liability." 24 Bus. LAWYER 523, 567 (Ruder) (1969).
Professor Loss observed,
The opinion, as I read it, doesn't say very much except that private rights of
action will be implied when they are necessary to the achievement of the
statutory objective.
In short, if I may say so with great respect, the Supreme Court in Borak
reached the right result not for the wrong reason but for no reason at all.
Surely the Court did not so much as breathe the one doctrine that most of us
thought was at the bottom of all this development of implied private rights.
namely, the doctrine in tort law that certain crimes are torts.
Id. at 532 (Loss).
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light of the wording of Rule lOb-5: "It shall be unlawful for any
person . .. [to do the prohibited acts] in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. ' 57 If a court bases implied
liability upon the intent of Congress, then the inclusion of the
words "or sale" would clearly indicate that Congress likewise
intended that the buyer should reap a benefit from the Rule.
However, if the buyer is allowed a Rule lOb-5 action, there arises
the problem of what to do with the restrictions which Congress
had placed as a condition for obtaining relief in the express civil
liability sections.
Ellis v. Carte?8 illustrates the dilemma. The case involved
an alleged oral communication by Carter, chairman of the board
of Republic Pictures Corporation, to Ellis, representing that the
sale of a certain number of shares would carry with it a voice in
the management of the corporation, which in fact it did not.
Although Ellis had an express remedy available to him in section
12(2), he based his amended complaint solely upon Rule lOb-5.
The court was faced with the decision of whether or not Ellis
should be allowed to use the judicially created remedy under
Rule lOb-5, thereby avoiding the restrictions of section 12(2). In
considering this anomalous situation the court saw four possible
alternatives.
The first alternative was to disallow a civil action to either
buyer or seller under lOb-5. This was the state of affairs between
1942, when the Rule was promulgated, and 1946, when the
Kardon decision was rendered. One reason in support of this
choice was that the Securities and Exchange Acts were too
closely drafted in point of time to permit an implied remedy in
addition to the ones expressly made available in sections II and
12 of the Securities Act and sections 9(e), 16(b), and 18(a) of the
Exchange Act. However, this left the defrauded seller with no
civil remedy under either act. The court felt that this was an
untenable position because it seemed inconsistent with the overall
purpose of the Acts, and unfairly drew a distinction between the
buyer and seller. 5
The second possible solution espoused in Ellis was to permit
sellers but not buyers to sue under the Rule. Two courts had
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1968) (emphasis added).
58. 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
59. Id. at 273.
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previously adopted this position in Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft
Corporation and Montague v. Electronic Corporation of
America.6 In Rosenberg the same judge who decided Kardon
denied the buyer an implied right to sue under Rule IOb-5 when
relief under section 11 of the Securities Act was available to him.
The court in Rosenberg reasoned that the Securities and
Exchange Acts were in pari materia and must be construed
together in order to have a consistent whole. Congress carefully
measured the relief it intended to give the buyer in sections II
and 12. It counterbalanced the relatively easy-to-prove actions
with an intricate system of defenses and restrictions. If a buyer
were allowed to plead an action under Rule lOb-5 when he had
an express remedy available, he would avoid the restrictions
which Congress had placed as a condition for obtaining relief.
Certainly Congress did not intend to casually nullify these
restrictions when it enacted section l0b of the Exchange Act."
The court in Montague reached the same conclusion via a
different rationale. It applied the rule of statutory construction
that if there is a general and a specific statute covering the same
situation, the specific will govern. Section II was a specific civil
remedy, while Rule lOb-5 was a general provision outlawing a
great variety of misconduct. Therefore, the specific remedy
afforded was deemed the exclusive means of relief. Thus
Montague refused to permit the plaintiff-buyer to avoid an
undertaking of $15,000 by merely pleading a cause of action
under Rule lOb-5.63
To these arguments Ellis responded that Rule lOb-5 was
expressly made applicable to buyers as well as sellers. There is no
good reason, declared the court, why Congress would want to
restrict buyers to the limited remedies of the Securities Act while
giving sellers unrestricted civil remedies under Rule lOb-5.6 '
The third choice posed by Ellis was to permit both buyers
and sellers to sue under Rule lOb-5, but to make the restrictions
of the Securities Act applicable to the buyer. Although this
would avoid the anomaly of giving the buyer a less restricted
60. 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
61. 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
62. 80 F. Supp. at 124.
63. 76 F. Supp. at 936.
64. 291 F.2d at 273.
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remedy under Rule lOb-5 than he had under the Securities Act,
it would in effect give him no right under the Exchange Act,
leaving an unexplained distinction between buyers and sellers. No
courts have followed this alternative.
The fourth choice, which was adopted by Ellis, was to
permit both buyers and sellers to sue under the Rule, free of the
restrictions of the Securities Act. The court explained:
While it assumes that Congress in 1934 undid what it
carefully did in 1933, it avoids judicial rewriting of the 1934
act to include procedural provisions which appear only in the
1933 act. As between two acts which deal with the problem, it
permits the most recent enactment to govern!5
The procedural safeguards for a section 12(2) suit which Ellis
would avoid by pleading a Rule lOb-5 action were: (1) the
allegation that he did not know of the untruth or omission himself;
(2) the defendant's affirmative defense of lack of knowledge that
the statement was untrue or misleading; (3) the short statute of
limitations of section 13 (under an implied action the State
statute of limitations is used); and (4) the discretionary
undertaking allowed the trial court under section 11(e) was not
applicable. Although the rationale used in Rosenberg and
Montague has found favor with many writers, the weight of
authority is with Ellis thus granting the buyer relief under the
Kardon doctrine, as an additional remedy."
D. The Added Ingredient of Fraud
Although Ellis cited Fischman v. Raytheon ManuJacturing
Co. 7 as authority for permitting a buyer to use the Kardon
65. Id. at 274.
66. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, at § 2.4(2). An occasional attempt is made by
a district court to deny a lOb-5 action when an express remedy is provided the plaintiff in
the Securities Act. E.g., Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 282 F. Supp. 87
(N.D. Ill. 1967) (buyer denied a lOb-5 action when section 12(2) of the Securities Act was
available to him). But the attempt was in vain as the Seventh Circuit fell in line with the
weight of authority, reversing the decision. Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor &
Co., 401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968) (based on Congressional intent, the express remedies and
implied lob-5 action are cumulative, not mutually exclusive). This rationale appears
questionable when the result of some cases allows the plaintiff to subvert the express
intent of Congress by riding roughshod over the restrictions. E.g.. Dack v. Shannon, 227
F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (buyer slept on his rights for three years and was barred by
a section 12 action, but was allowed to plead an implied section 17(a) action by using the
New York six year statute of limitations).
67. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
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doctrine, it overlooked that holding as a fifth possible
alternative. The plaintiffs in Fischman were preferred and
common shareholders who allegedly were fraudulently misled by
material contained in a registration statement only for the sale of
the preferred stock. The district court dismissed" the action as
to the common shareholders because (1) the prospectus was only
for preferred shares and therefore they had no section 11 action,
and (2) section II specifically gave a new remedy for a specific
type of misconduct for which the common shareholders were not
in the class protected. Therefore, Rule lOb-5 could not be used to
include them by implication. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, giving the common shareholders an implied
right to sue under Rule lOb-5, primarily for the same reason
stated in Kardon. That is, the common shareholders would
otherwise be without a federal remedy.Y
It should be noted, however, that the common shareholders
did have an express remedy available to them under section 12(2)
of the Securities Act. That the court did not explain why a Rule
lOb-5 action should be given in addition to what was provided by
Congress, was probably due to poor advocacy.-,
The court in Fisciman found that there was no conflict in
the overall statutory scheme by making the Kardon doctrine
available to the buyer when a misrepresentation was intentional.
According to the court, section 11 was aimed at negligent
misrepresentations. "[W]hen, to conduct actionable under §
11 of the 1933 Act, there is added the ingredient of fraud, then
that conduct becomes actionable under § l0b of the 1934 Act
and the Rule [for] any defrauded person, whether or not he could
maintain a suit under § 11 of the 1933 Act." 7'
The inherent weakness in Fischman is that Rule lOb-5 does
not on its face limit the outlawed conduct to intentional
misrepresentations. Note that Rule lOb-5(a) speaks in terms of a
"device, scheme or artifice to defraud. 7 Rule lOb-5(c) speaks in
68. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
69. See 188 F.2d at 787.
70. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 8, at 1783 n.335.
71. 188 F.2d at 787 (footnotes omitted). Likewise the court in dictum observed that
a suit under section 17 of the Securities Act was free of the restrictions of a section I I
suit, provided the plaintiff adds allegations of fraud. Id. at 787 n.2. This started a trend
of using section 17(a) and Rule lOb-5 interchangeably.
72. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1968). See note 46 supra.
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terms of an "act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit. '73 However Rule lOb-5(b)
does not appear to require knowledge of a misstatement as a
requisite to finding a violation:
[It shall be unlawful] to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statement made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading
74
Though presently unrealized, the vast potential for civil
liability lurks in subparagraph (b) of Rule lOb-5. 5 Based on its
express wording, a negligent misrepresentation may be
actionable. Some courts, following the lead of Ellis, take the rule
at face value and require no proof of "scienter." 71 Other courts
favor the Fischman theory of requiring that the plaintiff prove
some form of knowledge, at least a reckless disregard of the
facts from which knowledge of the misleading statement could be
imputed. 77 These courts "read into" subparagraph (b) the
ingredient of fraud,8 otherwise, it would be ultra vires of the
authority granted the SEC by section 10b of the Exchange
Act.7 1 Such an interpretation permits a court to resolve the
anomalies posed by Ellis under the pretense of fulfilling the
overall purpose of the two acts. Where only negligent
misrepresentations are alleged, the express civil liability
provisions would be the buyer's exclusive remedy. 0 Where
intentional misrepresentations are alleged the plaintiff would
have the option of choosing the express or the implied right of
action 8  This bit of judicial restraint on the Rule lOb-5
action at least lends some symmetry to the statutory scheme of the
federal securities acts, and thus gives some meaning to the
restrictions of the Securities Act.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See A.B.A. National Institute, supra note 56, at 613, 614 (Kaplan).
76. For the split of authority, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, at §§ 2.4(2), 2.6(1);
E. GADSBY.supra note 55, at § 5.03[1][d].
77. Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 772 (D. Colo. 1964); 3
L. Loss. supra note 8, at 1766.
78. E.g., Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc. 287 F. Supp. 188, 197 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
79. See note 77 supra.
80. See Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 766-72 (D. Colo.
1964); Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
81. Id.
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E. Punitive Damages
In 1968 a new anomaly was added to the list that the courts
had already created. In Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc."
punitive damages were allowed against the president of the
issuing company and its underwriter, where a Regulation A
exemption from the registration requirement of section 53 had
been utilized. The plaintiffs, 13 purchasers of common stock in
Law Research, alleged that they had bought the speculative stock
in reliance on the description in the offering circular of a key
contract with the nationally known Sperry Rand Corporation.
The contract was obviously an attractive feature to an investor,
as Sperry Rand was to perform vital services for Law Research.
The offering circular failed to disclose the fact that Sperry Rand
terminated the contract and that Law Research had commenced
a suit against them for performance. Because the president had
knowledge of these facts and failed to disclose them in the
offering circular, punitive damages were assessed against him.
His conduct perpetrated a gross fraud upon the public. Since
knowledge of the lawsuit was imputed to the corporate underwrit-
er, it was held liable as an aider and abettor of the fraud. Punitive
damages were justified on two grounds: (I) as a deterrent against
one who had deliberately and wantonly engaged in a far-flung
fraudulent scheme, systematically conducted for profit, and (2)
as an effective remedy for those who had only a small claim for
compensatory damages.'"
Clearly, the Exchange Act does not allow punitive
damages. 5 But the plaintiffs wisely claimed relief under both
Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act and section 17(a) of the
Securities Act. The court reasoned that because the Securities
Act did not prohibit punitive damages, then apparently Congress
intended to permit them.
Globus failed to specify whether state or federal law supplies
the standard for imposing punitive damages. If federal law is
used, it would provide a uniform standard. However, if state law
82. 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1964).
84. 287 F. Supp. at 194, 195.
85. See Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Green
v. Wolf Corp., 37 U.S.L.W. 2358 (2d Cir. 1968).
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is used within a federal structure, a legal morass would result from
the variations of conduct deemed sufficiently blameworthy to
award punitive damages. However, by implication, the law of the
State would probably be controlling if Globus is followed else-
where, because a New York case' regarding punitive damages
was consistently cited throughout the opinion.
Globus reaches the apex of unexplained anomalies by giving
the buyer a distinct advantage over the defrauded seller who may
only sue under the Exchange Act. Remember that prior to the
Kardon doctrine it was assumed that the buyer had no implied
right of action under section 17(a), s7 and it was only through
the express wording of Rule lOb-5 that the defrauded buyer was
given parity. Now the buyer has been afforded an even greater
advantage by suing under section 17(a). Globus is now on appeal
to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. It is unlikely that it will
be reversed. The courts have not been concerned with the entire
statutory scheme of the federal securities acts, failing to look at
them as one statute. Each court seems to create new law which it
believes is appropriate for the particular case before it. Globus is
an excellent example. The probable impact of the case on future
section II actions is uncertain, but it clearly provided incentive
for a buyer to plead under Rule lOb-5 in lieu of or in addition
to a section II action.
One case 8 has already held that when "the added ingredient
of fraud" is present in a misleading registration statement (which
would normally be actionable only under sections 11 or 12) then an
implied action would lie under Rule lOb-5. Whether Rule lOb-5
can be plead in lieu of section II for the negligent preparation of
a registration statement eventually will be decided in the Ninth
Circuit where "scienter" is not required for a Rule lOb-5 action
(following Ellis precedent). This will be the supreme test of back-
door jurisprudence: Will the courts circumvent what the draftsmen
of the federal securities law so carefully prescribed in limiting the
civil liability sections?9
86. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
87. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
88. Rosen v. Bergman, 40 F.R.D. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
89. See Henkel, Codification-Civil Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 22
Bus. LAWYER 866 (1967). Professor Jennings indicates that Montague should be followed
in refusing to permit a plaintiff to bypass section I I in favor of Rule l0b-5. id. at 878.
Professor Loss states that "until the Supreme Court says otherwise-that section I I
19691
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Undoubtedly, the recent cases of Escott v. BarChris
Construction CorpY and Globus reflect judicial concern with the
contemporary lax attitude' in preparing a registration statement
or a "junior registration" (offering circular) required by a
Regulation A exemption. Certainly protection of the purchasing
public can be achieved only by impressing upon promoters of
public offerings their responsibility to disclose the whole truth
when placing before the public a document which purports to
fairly represent a corporation's past performance. But "it must
be recognized that the general welfare of the country depends
upon a viable and vigorous business community." 2 The
uncertainty of who is liable for what under Rule lOb-5 may well
have an adverse effect on the viability of the entire securities
field. The anomalies that have developed with the application of
the Kardon doctrine to the buyer make it evident that a
reconstruction of Rule lOb-5 is essential in order to restore some
semblance of order and consistency to the federal securities law."'
The burden should fall upon the SEC, to whom Congress has
delegated the authority, to promulgate rules which would meet
the complex problems in this area. 4
II. INSIDER'S CONDUCT
A. Is It Really All That Bad
Before discussing the extent of liability for insider trading, it
is appropriate to point out that such conduct is not uniformly
condemned. While admittedly the trend of comment is the other
way, one argument in support of that practice is found in Henry
whatever you say about 12(2), overrides 10b-5." A.B.A. National Institute, supra note
56, at 534.
90. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (in a section II suit, varying standards of
reasonableness of investigation of facts put into the registration statement were imposed
on the underwriters, directors, officers and experts, depending on how close they were to
the facts).
91. In an investigation of the securities market by the SEC in 1963, it was
discovered that niany of the newer, inexperienced underwriters undertook no investigation
prior to sponsoring a new issue. S.E.C., REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES
MARKET OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION. H.R. Doc. No. 95, Part I,
88th Cong., Ist Sess. 513 (1963). See also, A.B.A. National Institute, supra'note 56, at
554.
92. Ruder, supra note 3, at 208.
93. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, at § 2.3; Henkel, supra note 89, at 871.
94. See note 47 supra.
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G. Manne's In Defense of Insider TraderYs Professor Manne
insists that the courts and commentators have taken too narrow
a view of what is more than a mere legal problem, but is in fact
a legal-economic dilemma going to the very heart of the system
of corporate capitalism. Manne's analysis revolves around such
basic questions as: who really gains and loses from insider
trading; what are the long run consequences of disallowing
insider trading; and can such trading feasibly be prevented?
Manne concludes not only that the market is rarely significantly
affected by insider trading, but that the average investor, whom
the SEC assertedly seeks to protect, is generally unaffected by it.
The speculator or trader to whom the SEC is less solicitous is
normally the one dealing with the insider, and therefore is the
party usually affected."
While Manne's advocacy of insider trading is not
conclusively persuasive, (he fails to expressly challenge the
pervasive belief that all investors should have equal access to
knowledge of material factsY)7 he does present the contrary
viewpoint of a practice that has been summarily declared to be
undesirable. As Professor Manne states:
In the entire literature on insider trading there does not exist
one careful analysis of the subject. . . . [M]ost lawyers do
not have the skills to develop a careful economic analysis
... . The tone of the debate has remained essentially
moralistic and question begging. Logic has been totally lost to
emotion."
Further, even if the undesirability of the practice is
conceded, the authors are not persuaded that the effect of this
practice warrants establishing such far-reaching liability as found
today. The call is- heard from writers and the courts that the
investor is in need of protectionY9 But as Professor Manne asks,
95. Manne, In Dejense ofInsider Trading, 44 HARV. Bus. REV. 113 (1966).
96. Id. at 114, 115. Manne reaches this conclusion from the premise that traders do
not act on so-called fundamental factors, but rather on recent changes in the price of a
security.
97. While not expressly rejecting this belief, Manne argues that in fact inside trading
is the only way to adequately compensate the entrepreneur. While admittedly this is at
the expense of some investor, that is not to" say the investor was injured by the
transaction. Arguably this is no different than compensation in salary comprising part of
the cost of goods sold and thereby being passed on to a consumer.
98. Manne, supra note 95, at 113.
99. But see San Diego Union, March'9, 1969, at H-Il, col. 1. Some suggest
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is the impact of insider trading really that significant? In terms
of dollars or number of shares traded the actual effect insider
trading has on either the market or private investors is
questionable. Courts apparently prefer to view investors as
"admittedly fully informed" purchasers of a company's stock. A
more reasonable and practical assumption would seem to be that
the investor knows there are people in the market with
knowledge superior to his, some due to their positions as
insiders; he then enters into transactions assuming that degree of
risk. Regardless of whether insider trading is really undesirable,
or whether its effect is de minimus, a practical analysis of
today's problem must start from the assumption of the courts,
that such a practice is undesirable, harmful and should be
eliminated.
B. Plaintiffs and Defendants Without Limit
The scope of the private right of action under Rule lOb-5
has been expanded purely on a case by case basis. As pointed out
earlier, it began with Kardon.10 0 There havd been subsequent
inconsistencies in the decisions, even within the Second Circuit
itself.'01 While there are some standard explanations given for
these inconsistencies, careful reading of the cases raises questions
as to the validity of them.1
2
The varying views of the elements of an action under Rule
lOb-5, some of which were discussed previously in relation to
buyers' actions, are a full study in themselves. 1" 3 In insider cases
the complete absence of any privity requirement or other limiting
factor for bringing an action under the Kardon doctrine has
opened a Pandora's box of plaintiffs. While there are some
protecting the small investor by eliminating him from the open market entirely and
restricting him to investing in mutual funds. However, not all brokers agree that this is a
proper solution.
100. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
101. 3 L. Loss, supra note 8, at 1767-69.
102. A good example of this is found in Judge Frank's dissent in Joseph v.
Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) afj'd per
curianz, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). Judge Frank seeks to restrict the applicability of the
decision in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), by pointing
out that in Birnbaunt neither party was a buyer or seller. A cursory reading of the
decision however, will reveal that the court made its decision, requiring sonic semblance
of privity to bring an action under Rule 10b-5, based purely on what they considered to
be the express legislative intent at the time of promulgation of the rule.
103. See note 10 supra.
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disturbing ramifications to this prospect alone, some recent
decisions have further increased the list of potential defendants.
One of th'e most alarming and far-reaching cases is the
controversial SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 04 The holding of
the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur has been examined
and re-examined, and written about extensively. To be sure the
end is not in sight. For the purposes of this discussion a
summary of how the court substantially expanded the liability of
insiders in the area of nondisclosure is pertinent.
First, the court expanded the definition of what constitutes a
material fact that must be disclosed. This is found in the court's
version of the test of materiality that rejects a "conservative
investor" rule which by its nature had limited "material" to a
more reliable degree of information'05 (i.e. a conservative investor
would tend to disregard more speculative information). Second,
there was an expanded definition of who is an insider. Now it is
unnecessary to be in any class in particular (e.g. corporate
officer); you need only possess the type of information that is
deemed to be material.'" Third, the court imposed a duty on an
insider not only to make a public disclosure, but also to delay
trading for an even longer period to allow the information
disclosed to be absorbed by the public. 0 7 Finally, it was held that
"tipping" is a violation as well as trading, if disclosure is not
made. A "tipping" violation relates not only to the liability of
the tippor, but also to the tippee who subsequently participates in
a tiansaction. 8
The results of the expanded boundaries of liability under the
Texas Gulf Sulphur decision are: (1) creation of a greater
number of people who may become defendants in the categories
of either insiders, tippors or tippees; (2) dissemination of more
information the use of which may cause one of these defendants
to be liable; and (3) the making of heretofore non-culpable
conduct with regard to this information a new basis for liability.
104. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
105. Id. at 849.
106. Id. at 848.
107. Id. at 853, 854. Coates v. S.E.C. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) petilion Jor cert.
filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1969) (No. 897). Director Coates is contending
that there is no such duty to wait, and further that Rule l0b-5 does not provide an
ascertainable standard of conduct as required by the Fifth Amendment.
108. 401 F.2d at 853.
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C. Recent Cases of Insider Trading and Failure to Disclose
Bearing in mind the wide realm of potential plaintiffs and
growing number of potential defendants, a look at current
actions begins to show the disturbing result if the theories are
carried to their logical end. There are numerous dilemmas posed
by recent cases.' The scope of this discussion, however, will be
limited to the need to restrict the number of plaintiffs who could
bring an action under Rule lOb-5.
One such action by the SEC under Rule lOb-5 was against a
registered broker-dealer, Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.110 Merrill Lynch was charged with providing selected
customers with information about the future earnings"' of
Douglas Aircraft Co. which allowed the selected customers to
sell and sell short to their own gain. Merrill Lynch acquired this
information by virtue of its position as managing underwriter for
a proposed offering by Douglas of convertible subordinated
debentures. Merrill Lynch waived public hearing and submitted
an offer of settlement to the Commission which was ultimately
accepted.
12
The bases claimed for the action brought against Merrill
Lynch were the principles set forth in In re Cady, Roberts &
Co." 3 and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co."' The Commission
109. It is arguable that these decisions may result in the broker no longer being able
to serve the dual function of underwriter and broker. The broker's duties to his customers
will conflict directly with his duties to fully disclose or abstain.
A similar and perhaps more distressing dilemma is that of the express trustee
administering investments under a trust instrument. When he receives pertinent
information, not yet disseminated to the market, from a broker or-underwriter-is he not
bound by his duty as trustee to use this information instantly in administering the trust?
At the same time, he is certainly a tippee for the purposes of Rule lob-5 and as such
faces possible liability for performing his duties as trustee.
110. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 8459, November 25, 1968, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,629.
I1l. Cf. Wiesen, Disclosure of Insider Injbrniation- Materiality and Texas Gull
Sulphur, 28 MD. L. REv. 189, 220 (1968).
112. The sanctions offered by Merrill Lynch and agreed to by the S.E.C. were the
suspension of activities of Merrill Lynch's New York Institutional Sales Office for 21
days, the suspension of activities of its West Coast Underwriting Office for 15 days, the
censure of various Merrill Lynch executives and dissociation of some of those same
executives for periods of from 21 to 60 days. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,629 at
83.351.
113. 40 S.E.C. 907, 911. The Commission in Cadyi. Roberts found a traditional
duty to disclose material information imposed on corporate insiders. This duty conies
into play when those with whom the insiders are dealing do not have this information
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noted from their holding in Cady, Roberts that such advance
information could not be utilized, and further concluded that the
information was intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose, not for anyone's personal benefit, because of the
inherent unfairness to the uninformed remainder of the investing
community. The Commission relied on the "disclose or
abstain" guidelines set forth in Cady, Roberts," ' and the court's
holding in Texas Gulf Sulphur that tipping of information to
another for use in a securities transaction is a violation. "' The
Commission maintained that the foregoing principles prohibited
disclosure of the information by Merrill Lynch to selected
persons, particularly in view of the fact that at the same time
Merrill Lynch was effecting purchases of Douglas stock for other
less favored customers.
Hearings presently being conducted by the SEC involving
selected customers of Merrill Lynch (several institutional
investors)" 7 promise to yield the first specific ruling on the extent
to which a "tippee" may act on information received from an
insider. Likewise, this may shed some light on the extent to
which the tippor is liable for the actions of the tippee. The
institutional investors are defending their conduct on a theory of
dubious promise, that the information they were given was too in-
accurate to qualify as "material."" ' Since the test of materiality
laid down by the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision rested on probable
effect of the information rather than its accuracy,"9 this approach
seems desperate. The institutional investors also claimed that their
actions were not the result of receiving the inside information,
but were dictated by other factors such as the fact that Douglas'
lower earnings had been rumored on Wall Street for three weeks
before the public announcement' 2  These factors will require a
which would affect their investment judgment. Not only did the Commission find the
insider's failure to disclose a violation of anti-fraud provisions, but went further and
found that if disclosure would be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances, the
alternative is to forego the transaction.
114. 401 F.2d 833.
115. 40 S.E.C. at 911.
116. 401 F.2d at 852, 853.
117. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Securities and Exchange
Commission Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-1680, August 26, 1968, CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. ' 77,596 at 83,275.
118. Securities Regulation and Transfer Report, January, 1969.
119. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
120. Wall St. J., January 21, 1969, at 7, col. 1.
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difficult resolution of conflicting facts by the court involved,
or an expansion of the "tippee's" duty to the extent of the
real insider's duty (disclose or abstain). It is unlikely that the
Commission would expect or even desire that the tippee disclose
publicly information, the validity or accuracy of which he would
be unable to ascertain. If that were so, the tippee would, and
may, be left with the choice of abstain or violate. As will be
seen, the Commission has no compunctions about placing parties
in that position.12'
A further aspect of the problem is typified by a suit recently
filed in the U.S. District Court in Denver, by Financial
Industrial Fund Inc., a Denver-based mutual fund, against
Merrill Lynch and McDonnell Douglas Corporation. 22 This case
also grows out of the SEC action against Merrill Lynch. The
fund claims a loss of just under $2 million on shares of Douglas
stock purchased from Merrill Lynch as a result of "touting
meetings" at which a favorable earnings picture was portrayed. 23
Financial is charging the defendants with aiding and abetting
violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule l0b-5
in that, while the purchases were being effected, Merrill Lynch
failed to disclose that Douglas in fact anticipated little or no
profits. While handling the purchases for Financial, Merrill
Lynch had advised other customers of the poor earnings
prospects for Douglas enabling those customers to sell and sell
short to their own gain. This is the first suit by a mutual fund
arising out of the action against Merrill Lynch, although a
number of private individual suits have been filed on charges that
the tipping schemes to which they were not privy caused them
losses. This case as well as the others mentioned, is based upon the
theory discussed in Texas Gulf Sulphur- liability of the tippor for
the profits made by the tippee.124
A further ramification of the action against Merrill Lynch is
found in an unobtrusive footnote to the SEC's release regarding
121. In re Blyth & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8499, January 17,
1969, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I 77,647.
122. Wall St. J., January 24, 1969, at 12, col. I.
123. Id. Financial claims to have purchased through Merrill Lynch 80,000 shares of
Douglas stock on June 22 and 23, 1966 at approximately $89 a share. It sold the 80,000
shares from July I through 8, 1966 at an average price of $65 a share, sustaining a total
loss of S1,969,226.00.




the settlement offer.12 5 The SEC stated that even if Merrill Lynch
had disclosed to all of its customers, there still would have been
a violation. If that had been done, all of Merrill Lynch's
customers would have had an unfair advantage over the
remainder of the investing public. This is consistent with the
theory of the cases thus far; but if Financial Industrial Fund is
allowed to recover, such a judgment, in view of that footnote,
could create a precedent for recovery by every person who
bought Douglas during the period in question. It is here that a
distinction between granting these persons a cause of action and,
going further, allowing them a remedy of damages becomes
critical.
Another expansion of enforcement under Rule lOb-5 is the
SEC action recently settled involving Blyth & Company.26 This
action was brought against Blyth for purchasing government
securities with the benefit of inside information. The Blyth case
is particularly important for two reasons. First, it is an
affirmation of the principle set forth in Cady, Roberts, that when
disclosure is improper or impossible, the insider must abstain
from trading. Secondly, and more significant, it held that the
anti-fraud provisions of Rule lOb-5 are applicable to government
securities. The court found that the legal principles of Cady,
Roberts, Texas Gulf Sulphur and Merrill Lynch were applicable
to government securities as well as to all non-exempt securities.
127
The information that the insiders possessed in Blyth was secret
government information that could not be disclosed' 2 This hard
line by the SEC is indicative of what their attitude is likely to be
toward the institutional investor-defendants in Merrill Lynch.
A recent action by the SEC against Great American
Industries, Inc.'2 1 goes further than any previous case. Violations
125. CCH FED. SEC, L. REP. ' 77,629 at 83,349 n.8.
126. See note 121 supra.
127. CCH FID. SEC. L. R:. ' 77.629 at 83,398.
128. The S.E.C. found that from January 1964 to November 1967, Blyth's
government bond department received advance information about the terms of new
Government financings. This was possible under the Federal Government's procedure,
since revised, of giving advance notice or terms such as interest rates and maturity dates
to the Federal Reserve System. The information was given to Bythe by an employee of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
129. S.E.C. v. Great American Industries, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,325
(2d Cir. 1968).
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of Section 13(a) 3 and Rule 13a- 111'3 and Rule 1Ob-5 were
charged by the Commission. The violations resulted from press
releases issued by Great American which were substantially
inaccurate and required public correction. Great American had
acquired options on certain mining properties. The press releases
concerning this acquisition were found deficient by the SEC
because of gross inaccuracies in describing when the mines could
be put into production, and the failure of Great American to
disclose that two-thirds of the purchase price of the property was
to be passed on by the sellers to intermediaries in the form of
finder's fees. The latter circumstance is of most concern here.
The court in basing its ruling as to the non-disclosure on
Texas Gulf Sulphur, found no trouble applying its principles.
They held that reasonable traders in stock very likely would have
re-evaluated the worth of the property as well as the judgment of
those who bought it, if they had known that two-thirds of the
price was going to "finders." There would seem to be little argu-
ment with that conclusion as far as it goes. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, has again demonstrated its mastery of
the art of circuitous reasoning in dealing with the sellers of the
property. Judge Friendly recognized that to read Rule lOb-5 as
imposing an affirmative duty on one who had no special relation-
ship to a seller or buyer of securities "would be occupying new
ground and would require most careful consideration."'1 2 He
further stated that due to the unsatisfactory record available to the
court that they "were loathe" to do so. However, upon determining
that the partial statements were misleading, he referred to the Re-
statement of Torts and found there was a breach of the duty
to disclose. Considering this breach to constitute common law
fraud in connection with the purchase of securities, he found lOb-5
"plainly applicable.' '33 Whatever the rationale or explanation,
Rule lOb-5 was held to have been violated when the sellers of the
property failed to publicly disclose the substantial amount of the
proceeds that were to be passed on to the finders.
3
1
130. 15 U.S.C. 78m(a) (1964).
131. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-II (1968).
132. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,325 at 97,541.
133. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 24.551(2)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966). This is a
deceit provision relating to disclosure in a business transaction. Yet here neither party to
the transaction was dissatisfied, and the court still used this as a wedge to accomplish
that which they said one paragraph earlier they could not do.
134. See Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956), not relied upon by the
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Both Judge Kaufman and Judge Hays in concurring
opinions place great emphasis on the potential spread of damage
to others, due to the fact that the purchase price was paid in
securitiesY.5 Their misgivings may be validY.'6 However, Judge
Kaufman distinguishes such a transaction from one on a cash
basis by noting that only the buyer and seller in a cash
transaction are injured by a fraud. This is an oversimplification.
People could decide to buy or sell a stock on the basis of a $3.6
million acquisition of property for cash as easily as where the
consideration was stock.
Since the distinction between stock and cash transaction is
not as clear as the Second Circuit considers it, it is questionable
whether the transaction was within the class intended to be
regulated by Rule lOb-5. Both parties to the sale were apparently
satisfied, yet 'both were penalized. There was not any actual
purchase or sale of stock to which the SEC could point to find
injury. Is this really a failure to disclose "in connection with"
the purchase or sale of a security?
A unique and disconcerting aspect of this case is that it in
effect makes Rule lOb-5 a means by which a federal agency can
"protect" the stockholders of a corporation from what it
considers to be "questionable business judgment."
Regardless of the soundness of the decision, this case has
created *a further category of potential defendants: (1) the seller
who is paid in stock and does not properly disclose the intended
use of his proceeds, and (2) the buyer who does not disclose what
he also knows in that regard. The result prompted Judge Moore,
in dissent, to say, "The SEC has advanced '1984' by at least 15
years and casts the ominous shadow of Big Brother over the desk
of every executive and over the tables around which directors
gather."''3:7 While not everyone may feel as strongly as Judge
Moore, this decision will cause comment for some time to come.
court. The Errion case is critically discussed in Comment, Rule X-lOB-5: An Unlikely
Basis Jbr Expanding Federal Jurisdiction, 9 STAN. L. REv. 589 (1957).
135. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. C 92,325 at 97,542, 97,543.
136. Judge Kaufman's views are valid to an extent, but seem too broad to give an
accurate analysis of the problem. It could, for example, be true that a stock payment
would have a more direct effect on the market. But the mere fact of stock being involved
in a transaction is probably the most tenuous ground yet for invoking Rule lOb-5. It
seems that protection of the parties to the transaction is merely incidental or collateral to
the S.E.C.'s action.
137. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. C' 92,325, at 97,557.
19691
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Careful analysis of the relationships in these cases,
considered in the context of the preceding discussion of buyer's
actions, reveals the possibility of extraordinary potential liability.
In commenting on Texas Gulf Sulphur, Professor Robert L.
Knauss concluded that if any seller was entitled to a remedy, all
sellers of Texas Gulf stock during this period were entitled to a
remedy. 38 It could as easily be concluded that if the object of the
Exchange Act is to protect investors, there also should be a
remedy for the non-transactors, those investors who would have
purchased Texas Gulf stock had they known the inside
information. 39 Professor Loss finds a "lovely question" in the
problem presented in Texas Gulf Sulphur as to the tippor's
liability. 40 How are the tippee's profits to be determined, and is
the tippor liable to those to whom the tippee is liable?
D. The Problem
The scope of liability is readily apparent if such liability is
extended to include all allegedly injured participants in an open
market transaction. The magnitude of this potential liability can
be seen by an examination of the categories of parties now
subject to a Rule lOb-5 action. A defendant in such an action





(5) insider-who did not disclose
(6) insider-who partially discloses
(7) outsider-dealing with a corporation
It is possible that an action could be brought under Rule lOb-5
by those who are:
(1) buyers from insiders
(2) sellers to insiders
(3) buyers on the open market
(4) sellers on the open market
138. Knauss, Disclosure Requirements -Changing Concepts oJ Liability', 24 Bus.
LAWYER 43, 56 (1968).
139. Contra Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1951).
140. A.B.A. National Institute, supra note 56, at 534.
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(5) buyers from tippees
(a) against either the tippor or the tippee
(6) sellers to tippees
(a) against either the tippor or the tippee
While this is a substantial array of parties under Rule lOb-5,
there is no indication that the end is in sight. The extreme case
would seem to be where a plaintiff who bought or sold a security
from a non-insider, who had no special knowledge, tries to
recover damages from a non-disclosing insider with whom he has
never dealt. The problems are the same whether the plaintiff
seeks full damages or mere restitution. An action under Rule lOb-
5 for non-disclosure of a material fact has at this point no
express limit. Anyone could allege that he would have acted
differently had he known the information, and as a result
contend that he was injured. There are a multitude of un-
answered questions under these new definitions and potential
violations, each a study in itself. The crucial question has been
raised by a director of Texas Gulf Sulphur: does Rule lOb-5
provide an ascertainable standard of conduct as required by the
Fifth Amendment?4 ' It is questionable. Under present law, there
exists an almost unlimited field for plaintiffs. It is clear that
limitations of some type are in order. This would seem to be a
proper legislative function, but until such action is taken the
courts which have created the problems now must resolve them.
The judiciary must determine how they are to prevent insider
trading on the strength of undisclosed material information, and
yet do so in a logical and equitable manner.
There would appear to be nothing objectionable about the
specific actions brought by the SEC to enjoin or impose other
administrative sanctions. Likewise private actions where there is
a privity relationship of some type seem fair and proper.
However, it is critical to distinguish attempts by individuals
to recover (either damages or in restitution) for violations that-
affect investors only in a general way, when the plaintiffs have
not dealt with any insider. This occurs most frequently in the
area of open market transactions on an exchange or in formal
over the counter transactions. The court in Texas Gulf Sulphu'
42
141. See note 10supra.
142. 401 F.2d at 868.
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and Great A nierican Industries"' was clearly concerned with the
potential private actions for damages.
There are numerous objections, relating mainly to
mechanics, to any approach granting rescission and restitution,
or damages to open market transactors who bought or sold the
security involved. There are great difficulties in tracing
certificates through the clearing house' and these difficulties are
complicated by the activities of a specialist. Even once the
certificates have been traced, little more has been accomplished
than to give a windfall to persons whose certificates ended up
with the defendants involved or vice versa if the plaintiff is a
buyer. Such a remedy would be little more than arbitrary and
would clearly be subject to criticism, justifiably leveled, for
failing to insure that the proper party is compensated.
E. A Recommendation
With the privity requirement in an action based on the
Kardon doctrine eliminated, and not likely to be returned, a
different type of limitation is required. The previously discussed
problems surface in cases of violations involving securities traded
on a stock exchange or on the formal over the counter market,
where all investors have an interest and are affected in a general
way. Here is where a limitation on private recoveries is needed,
without precluding recovery merely because the transaction
occurred on the open market. An adequate remedy would allow
no recoveries by open market transactors except in special
circumstances.
1) Restitution-To cover the vast majority of cases, a restitution-
ary remedy of disgorgement of profits to the corporation should be
available to the SEC or to individuals. This is no more than what
is presently available in actions under Section 16(b).1' Such a
remedy was recently allowed in Diamond v. Oreamunol4" on a
143. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ' 92,325, at 97,543.
144. This fact and the arbitrary result are highlighted by the recently developed
problem of securities thefts on a large scale. The situation has been aggravated by the
paper-jam in brokerage houses. The reports of amounts of losses are sparse due to
reticence on the part of securities industry and law enforcement officials, but include
estimates of up to S50 million in stolen securities circulating in the underworld. San
Diego Union, March 9, 1969, at I, col. I (home ed.).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
146. 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1968).
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claim of conversion of corporate property (inside information) in
an open market transaction involving insider trading and a failure
to disclose. Justification for returning the profits to the corporation
arguably can be found in the resulting injury to the interest
the corporation has in maintaining a good image and hence a
good trading market for its securities. Publicized insider trading
activities detract from this desired image.
2) Special Circumstances-An equitable solution would not require
that trading on the open market constitute a complete bar
to recovery of damages. In those open market transaction
cases where "clear and convincing proof" of related personal
dealings with nondisclosing insiders (e.g. where the broker ef-
fecting the purchase had knowledge of the material fact
involved) can be shown, then damages rather than disgorgement
would be proper. This would allow recovery in those cases where
most would agree it is needed, while a high standard of proof
would preclude the undesirable windfall effect.
The above approach would discourage the misuse of inside
information in that either alternative remedy removes the
incentive of profit.Y4 7 What it does not do is subject the insider,
who, arguably, is blameless, to excessive48 or double liability.49
It does not turn the courtroom into an arena in which an
individual might recoup losses suffered due to his own error in
judgment. Likewise the denial of a private action under the above
special circumstances would not be inconsistent with the existing
decisions, and perhaps not even be objectionable to the SEC1"
147. An incentive for the bringing of actions for disgorgement of profits was
recently demonstrated in the case of Blau v. Brown, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. • 92,263
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), where attorneys were allowed 20% of short-swing profits recovered in a
section 16(b) action as a reasonable fee.
148. The potential private actions in the Texas GulJ Sulphur case reportedly total
over S77 million. Knauss, supra note 138, at 53.
149. In Dianond v. Oreantuo the court stated, "... [They] may conceivably be
sued by the purchasers of their stock for culpable failure to disclose material information.
and . . . may incur double liability if the suits should be brought and prove
successful. ... 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300, 305 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1968)
(emphasis added).
150. It is quite possible this may not be inconsistent even with the desires of the
S.E.C. Irving M. Pollack, Director, Division of Trading and Markets, S.E.C.. stated that
.'we at the Commission look upon the Texas Gulf prayer for relief as requesting an equitable
remedy of divesture of profits rather than as the assertion of somebody's private right of
action." PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE. DiscLOsURi" REQUIRE\IENTS 01- PUBLIC CO\I-
PA\IIS A\D INSIDIIRs 290 (1967). The courts have expressly stated their concern over
potential private actions. 401 F.2d at 868; CCH FED. SEC. L. RIP. ' 92,325, at 97543.
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The SEC could still bring its own actions, seeking injunctions for
example. Moreover, the courts in reaching their decisions would
not have to be concerned with the far-reaching effect of their
decision on private litigation flowing from the SEC action.''
E. Summation
It appears that a reevaluation of Rule l0b-5 is in order. One
thing is clear in all recent actions by the SEC-there has been no
evaluation per se of what, if any, actual damage to individuals
has occurred. Plainly it is as absurd to argue that no investor
has been damaged as it is to argue that every investor connected
with a security transaction involving a nondisclosing insider has
been damaged. Even if a disclosure were made, not everyone
would attach the same significance to it. It has been suggested
that the insider's disclosure may distort the prospective value of
the securities. 52 It is entirely possible that excessive reliance
would be placed on an insider's information.
The growth of liabilities under Rule lOb-5 has been a
"bootstrap" operation. Each case has been justified by the one
before it, all going back to Texas Gulf Sulphur. It is time to step
back and examine these developments anew, in light of analyses
such as thpse suggested by Professor Manne. Is the attack on
insider conduct preventing actual public harm, or are the attacks
initiated merely because the conduct seems morally reprehensible
or unfair to the individual purchaser or seller?
A great amount of disagreement has been said to exist
between the Nixon administration and the SEC clue to the
administration's dissatisfaction with the practices of the
Commission. This conflict is evident from statements and
conduct on both sides. t53 The dispute has overtones which go
151. For a similar but more restrictive remedy, see the suggestion in Knauss. supra
note 138, at 57.
152. Comment, The Prospects JOr Rule X-lOB-5: An Emerging Remedy For
Dejrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1148 (1950).
153. NEWSWEEK. Nov. II, 1968, at 54, discusses the now famous letter from
President Nixon to investment men condemning "heavy handed regulatory schemes," It
has been reported that President Nixon is considering "watch-dog committees" over
certain federal agencies including the S.E.C. Significant also is the bringing of the action
against Blyth, note 121 supra, on the very eve of President Nixon's inauguration.
(Y. P-H LAWYER'S WEEKLY REPORT, § 2 (March 17, 1969). The report considers
President Nixon's appointment of Hamer Budge as Chairman of the S.E.C. as a sign
that he is not going to reverse the direction of the S.E.C. Mr. Budge has supported most
of the recent S.E.C. activity.
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beyond mere disagreement over the use of Rule l0b-5 and run to
basic political philosophies. A collision between the views seems
unavoidable. It is hoped that the outcome will be constructive,
and will bring an end to the case-by-case disorder that has
characterized this area of the law for over twenty years. A
limitation on private actions would be the first step in the right
direction. Subsequent thought and analysis should lead to a
reconsideration of the proper use of the federal securities law and
a return to reasonableness.
III. CONCLUSION
Rule l0b-5 has become a judicially expanded remedy that
has grown from an innocuous theory of liability as stated in
Kardon to what is now the cornerstone of a federal common law
of corporations. The remedy has been defined by the courts without
uniformity. Its uncertainties and vagaries have resulted from
conflicts between political-social philosophies and conflicts
between the need for protection against stock swindles and the
fear of unlimited liability bringing a flood of litigation.
The arguments for having the express remedies of the
Securities Act as exclusive ones in federal courts, and the need
for reasonable limitations on insider liability related to open
market transactions are valid in theory. But for the practicing
attorney, they are not yet persuasive arguments for a client who
in some undefined degree was "morally" or "legally" culpable.
They are valid limitations for the legislature to consider if and
when the confusion which surrounds these implied civil remedies
is eliminated by a recodification as is earnestly urged.
Meanwhile, the legal community will suffer from the
unpredictability that abounds under the symbol IOb-5.
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